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McGowen v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 89 (Nov. 21, 2018) (en banc)1 
 
CIVIL LAW: WRIT OF MANDAMUS 
 
Summary 
 
 The Court determined that Nevada caselaw and NRCP 4(c) give conflicting opinions on 
whether an attorney or their employee can serve someone for their client. Moreover, the Court 
clarified that the purpose of the 2004 amendment to NRCP 4(c) was to mirror FRCP 4(c)(2) to 
interpret the exclusion of counsel as a “party”. 
 
Background 
 
McGowen is a licensed and practicing attorney in Texas. McGowen was invited to a 
settlement conference in Nevada by a party to an unrelated dispute in which one of his client’s had 
an interest in. McGowen attended the settlement conference and a deposition in Nevada on behalf 
of his client. He was later served with a summons and complaint after the conclusion of the 
deposition. There are conflicting arguments as to whether W. Chris Wicker, the attorney of the 
plaintiff in the complaint, or Dianne Kelling, Wicker’s assistant at his firm, served McGowen. 
McGowen moved to quash the service and dismiss the case, interpreting NRCP 4(c) to 
state that plaintiff’s counsel and employees of the counsel cannot serve on behalf of their client 
because they are not disinterested persons to the complaint. 
 
Discussion 
 
We elect to consider the writ petition 
 
 The Court must first determine if it will consider the petition for writ. The Court relied on 
language from Cote H. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., which states that “[a] writ of mandamus is 
available to compel the performance of an act which the law . . . [requires] as a duty resulting from 
an office, trust or station, or to control a manifest abuse or an arbitrary or capricious exercise of 
discretion.”2 Further, NRS § 34.170 clarifies that this type of relief is typically only given when 
no “plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law” is available.3 
 McGowen argued that there is no plain, speedy or adequate remedy because, even if he 
appeals the district court’s decision after the case has ended, he would have wasted a large amount 
of resources on the case. Further, he does not believe the district court even has jurisdiction over 
it because he does not have enough minimum contacts in Nevada. McGowen argues that the 
caselaw in Nevada and the NRCP conflict in language on whether an attorney or their employee 
may serve as a disinterested person on behalf of their client, and therefore his petition should be 
considered. Crystal, the plaintiff of the unrelated case that was attempting to serve McGowen, 
argues that the language of NRCP 4(c) is unambiguous and McGowen’s writ should be denied. 
 The Court agreed with McGowen that there is conflicting language between the NRCP and 
Nevada caselaw and accepted his petition accordingly. 
                                                     
1  By Darcy Bower. 
2  124 Nev. 36, 39, 175 P.3d 906, 907–08 (2008). 
3  NEV. REV. STAT. § 34.170 (2017). 
NRCP 4(c) does not prohibit service of process by a plaintiff’s attorney or the attorney’s employee 
 
The specific language of the rule states that “[p]rocess shall be served . . . by any person 
who is not a party and who is over 18 years of age."4 McGowen argues that the 2004 amendment 
to the rule codifies Sawyer v. Sugarless Shops, Inc., such that the term “party” includes the attorney 
for the plaintiff and their employees.5 Crystal, on the other hand, argues that the district court’s 
holding does not violate the plain language of NRCP 4(c) because the 2004 amendment to the rule 
superseded the common law. Further, dicta from Sawyer only said that "service is best taken away 
from the parties or their counsel or counsel's employees"6 Finally, Crystal argues that the language 
of the rule is almost identical to the FRCP4(c)(2), which the federal courts have interpreted to 
allow service by an attorney of the plaintiff or their employee. 
The Court discusses three inconsistencies within the drafter’s note of the 2004 amendment 
to NRCP 4(c). The first inconsistency is the reference to the common law term “disinterested 
person.” While the drafter’s note uses this term, it failed to include the term in the language of the 
rule amendment. Second, when the drafter’s note cites to Sawyer, it did not use “disinterested 
person,” but rather restated the plain language of the rule. Lastly, the drafter’s note discusses that 
the purpose of the amendment is to make it consistent with the federal rule. At the time of the 
amendment, the federal courts interpreted FRCP 4(c)(2) to allow service by plaintiffs’ attorneys. 
 The drafter’s note to the 2004 amendment clearly states that the goal was to conform the 
rule to its federal counterpart which interprets the word “party” to exclude counsel and, therefore, 
the Court concluded that NRCP 4(c)’s language does so as well. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Court held that the plain language of NRCP 4(c) does not exclude the plaintiff’s 
attorney or employees of the attorney. Accordingly, the Court held that the district court properly 
denied the motion to quash and thus denied McGowan’s petition for a writ of mandamus. 
 
PICKERING, J., Dissented 
 
 There is long-standing Nevada precedent in Sawyer which holds that the term “party” 
includes the lawyers of the parties of the case.7 Further, this Court does not defer to federal case 
law to interpret the state rules for three reasons. First, the federal case law that the majority relies 
on is thin and split among the districts. Second, the Court cannot read this starting on a fresh slate, 
but rather needs to take into consideration the long-standing Nevada caselaw, which states that the 
party and the attorney to the party might as well be the same person. Third, the majority relies on 
the drafter’s note to the 2004 amendment, however that note expressly supports the holding in 
Sawyer.8 The dissent therefore concludes that this Court is bound by previous Nevada precedent 
and should have granted the writ. 
                                                     
4  NEV. R. CIV. P. 4(c). 
5  106 Nev. at 270, 792 P.2d at 17. 
6  Id. (emphasis added). 
7  106 Nev. 265, 269-70, 792 P.2d 14, 17 (1990). 
8  106 Nev. at 269, 792 P.2d at 17. 
